Volume 41, Number 1, October 2002

• 
  Gary Bornstein, Uri Gneezy, Rosmarie Nagel: The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: an experimental study. 1-25
• 
  David J. Cooper, Carol Kraker Stockman: Fairness and learning: an experimental examination. 26-45
• 
  Stefano Demichelis, Fabrizio Germano: On (un)knots and dynamics in games. 46-60
• 
  Lars-Göran Mattsson, Jörgen W. Weibull: Probabilistic choice and procedurally bounded rationality. 61-78
• 
  Robert Samuel Simon: Separation of joint plan equilibrium payoffs from the min-max functions. 79-102
• 
  Nurlan Turdaliev: Calibration and Bayesian learning. 103-119
• 
  Oscar Volij, Eyal Winter: On risk aversion and bargaining outcomes. 120-140
• 
  Asher Wolinsky: Eliciting information from multiple experts. 141-160
• 
  Yair Tauman: A note on k-price auctions with complete information. 161-164
• 
  Albert Burgos, Simon Grant, Atsushi Kajii: Corrigendum to "Bargaining and boldness": [Games and Economic Behavior 38 (2002) 28-51]. 165-168

Volume 41, Number 2, November 2002

• 
  Lutz-Alexander Busch, Ignatius J. Horstmann: The game of negotiations: ordering issues and implementing agreements. 169-191
• 
  Ramon Faulí-Oller, Joel Sandonís: Welfare reducing licensing. 192-205
• 
  Olivier Gossner, Nicolas Vieille: How to play with a biased coin? 206-226
• 
  Sergiu Hart: Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction. 227-264
• 
  Matthew O. Jackson, Alison Watts: On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games. 265-291
• 
  Eiichi Miyagawa: Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions. 292-308
• 
  Maria Montero: Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel. 309-321
• 
  Henk Norde, Hans Reijnierse: A dual description of the class of games with a population monotonic allocation scheme. 322-343
• 
  Karl Wärneryd: Rent, risk, and replication: Preference adaptation in winner-take-all markets. 344-364

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