 | 2011 |
|---|
| 11 |       | Michael Zuckerman,
Omer Lev,
Jeffrey S. Rosenschein:
An algorithm for the coalitional manipulation problem under Maximin.
AAMAS 2011: 845-852 |
| 10 | | Michael Zuckerman,
Piotr Faliszewski,
Vincent Conitzer,
Jeffrey S. Rosenschein:
An NTU Cooperative Game Theoretic View of Manipulating Elections.
WINE 2011: 363-374 |
| 2010 |
|---|
| 9 | | Yoram Bachrach,
Michael Zuckerman,
Michael Wooldridge,
Jeffrey S. Rosenschein:
Proof Systems and Transformation Games.
MFCS 2010: 78-89 |
| 2009 |
|---|
| 8 | | Yoram Bachrach,
Reshef Meir,
Michael Zuckerman,
Jörg Rothe,
Jeffrey S. Rosenschein:
The cost of stability in weighted voting games.
AAMAS (2) 2009: 1289-1290 |
| 7 | | Lirong Xia,
Michael Zuckerman,
Ariel D. Procaccia,
Vincent Conitzer,
Jeffrey S. Rosenschein:
Complexity of Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation under Some Common Voting Rules.
IJCAI 2009: 348-353 |
| 6 | | Yoram Bachrach,
Edith Elkind,
Reshef Meir,
Dmitrii V. Pasechnik,
Michael Zuckerman,
Jörg Rothe,
Jeffrey S. Rosenschein:
The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games.
SAGT 2009: 122-134 |
| 5 | | Michael Zuckerman,
Ariel D. Procaccia,
Jeffrey S. Rosenschein:
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem.
Artif. Intell. 173(2): 392-412 (2009) |
| 4 | | Yoram Bachrach,
Edith Elkind,
Reshef Meir,
Dmitrii V. Pasechnik,
Michael Zuckerman,
Jörg Rothe,
Jeffrey S. Rosenschein:
The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games
CoRR abs/0907.4385: (2009) |
| 3 | | Yoram Bachrach,
Michael Zuckerman,
Jeffrey S. Rosenschein:
Effort Games and the Price of Myopia.
Math. Log. Q. 55(4): 377-396 (2009) |
| 2008 |
|---|
| 2 |  | Michael Zuckerman,
Piotr Faliszewski,
Yoram Bachrach,
Edith Elkind:
Manipulating the Quota in Weighted Voting Games.
AAAI 2008: 215-220 |
| 1 | | Michael Zuckerman,
Ariel D. Procaccia,
Jeffrey S. Rosenschein:
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem.
SODA 2008: 277-286 |
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