![]() | ![]() |
| 2012 | ||
|---|---|---|
| 127 | Haoqi Zhang, Edith Law, Rob Miller, Krzysztof Gajos, David C. Parkes, Eric Horvitz: Human computation tasks with global constraints. CHI 2012: 217-226 | |
| 126 | Victor Shnayder, Jeremy Hoon, David C. Parkes, Vikas Kawadia: Truthful prioritization schemes for spectrum sharing. INFOCOM Workshops 2012: 196-201 | |
| 125 | Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes: Quantifying the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms via Metrics on Payoff Distributions CoRR abs/1205.2630: (2012) | |
| 2011 | ||
| 124 | Jens Witkowski, Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes: Incentive-Compatible Escrow Mechanisms. AAAI 2011 | |
| 123 | Florin Constantin, Malvika Rao, Chien-Chung Huang, David C. Parkes: On Expressing Value Externalities in Position Auctions. AAAI 2011 | |
| 122 | Yuga J. Cohler, John K. Lai, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia: Optimal Envy-Free Cake Cutting. AAAI 2011 | |
| 121 | Yiling Chen, Jerry Kung, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Haoqi Zhang: Incentive design for adaptive agents. AAMAS 2011: 627-634 | |
| 120 | Enrico H. Gerding, Valentin Robu, Sebastian Stein, David C. Parkes, Alex Rogers, Nicholas R. Jennings: Online mechanism design for electric vehicle charging. AAMAS 2011: 811-818 | |
| 119 | Panagiotis Toulis, David C. Parkes: A random graph model of kidney exchanges: efficiency, individual-rationality and incentives. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2011: 323-332 | |
| 118 | Paul Dütting, Felix Fischer, David C. Parkes: Simplicity-expressiveness tradeoffs in mechanism design. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2011: 341-350 | |
| 117 | Shaili Jain, David C. Parkes: Combinatorial Agency of Threshold Functions. SAGT 2011: 154-165 | |
| 116 | Paul Dütting, Felix Fischer, David C. Parkes: Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanism Design CoRR abs/1102.3632: (2011) | |
| 115 | Joseph Y. Halpern, David C. Parkes: Viewpoint: Journals for Certification, Conferences for Rapid Dissemination CoRR abs/1106.2649: (2011) | |
| 114 | Jonathan Bredin, Quang Duong, David C. Parkes: Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching Patient Agents CoRR abs/1111.0046: (2011) | |
| 113 | David C. Parkes: Complex financial products: caveat emptor: technical perspective. Commun. ACM 54(5): 100 (2011) | |
| 112 | Joseph Y. Halpern, David C. Parkes: Journals for certification, conferences for rapid dissemination. Commun. ACM 54(8): 36-38 (2011) | |
| 2010 | ||
| 111 | David C. Parkes, Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Moshe Tennenholtz: Proceedings 11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2010), Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, June 7-11, 2010 ACM 2010 | |
| 110 | Sven Seuken, Jie Tang, David C. Parkes: Accounting Mechanisms for Distributed Work Systems. AAAI 2010 | |
| 109 | William E. Walsh, Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm, Rob Shields, George L. Nemhauser, David C. Parkes: Automated Channel Abstraction for Advertising Auctions. AAAI 2010 | |
| 108 | Sven Seuken, Kamal Jain, David C. Parkes: Hidden Market Design. AAAI 2010 | |
| 107 | James Zou, Sujit Gujar, David C. Parkes: Tolerable Manipulability in Dynamic Assignment without Money. AAAI 2010 | |
| 106 | Yiling Chen, John K. Lai, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia: Truth, Justice, and Cake Cutting. AAAI 2010 | |
| 105 | Jie Tang, Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes: Hybrid transitive trust mechanisms. AAMAS 2010: 233-240 | |
| 104 | Sujit Gujar, David C. Parkes: Dynamic Matching with a Fall-back Option. ECAI 2010: 263-268 | |
| 103 | Mark Klein, Gabriel A. Moreno, David C. Parkes, Kurt C. Wallnau: Designing for incentives: better information sharing for better software engineering. FoSER 2010: 195-200 | |
| 102 | David F. Bacon, Eric Bokelberg, Yiling Chen, Ian A. Kash, David C. Parkes, Malvika Rao, Manu Sridharan: Software economies. FoSER 2010: 7-12 | |
| 101 | Ian A. Kash, David C. Parkes: Impersonation Strategies in Auctions. WINE 2010: 492-495 | |
| 100 | David C. Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Florin Constantin, Satinder P. Singh: Dynamic Incentive Mechanisms. AI Magazine 31(4): 79-94 (2010) | |
| 99 | Loizos Michael, David C. Parkes, Avi Pfeffer: Specifying and monitoring economic environments using rights and obligations. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 20(2): 158-197 (2010) | |
| 98 | Pavithra Harsha, Cynthia Barnhart, David C. Parkes, Haoqi Zhang: Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions. Computers & OR 37(7): 1271-1284 (2010) | |
| 2009 | ||
| 97 | Julien Freudiger, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, David C. Parkes: On non-cooperative location privacy: a game-theoretic analysis. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security 2009: 324-337 | |
| 96 | Shaili Jain, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes: Designing incentives for online question and answer forums. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2009: 129-138 | |
| 95 | Haoqi Zhang, David C. Parkes, Yiling Chen: Policy teaching through reward function learning. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2009: 295-304 | |
| 94 | Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes: Self-correcting sampling-based dynamic multi-unit auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2009: 89-98 | |
| 93 | Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes: Fair Package Assignment. AMMA 2009: 92 | |
| 92 | Christopher Thorpe, David C. Parkes: Cryptographic Combinatorial Securities Exchanges. Financial Cryptography 2009: 285-304 | |
| 91 | David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Christopher Thorpe: Cryptographic Combinatorial Clock-Proxy Auctions. Financial Cryptography 2009: 305-324 | |
| 90 | Benjamin Lubin, Jeffrey O. Kephart, Rajarshi Das, David C. Parkes: Expressive Power-Based Resource Allocation for Data Centers. IJCAI 2009: 1451-1456 | |
| 89 | Haoqi Zhang, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes: A General Approach to Environment Design with One Agent. IJCAI 2009: 2002-2014 | |
| 88 | Jacomo Corbo, Shaili Jain, Michael Mitzenmacher, David C. Parkes: An Economically-Principled Generative Model of AS Graph Connectivity. INFOCOM 2009: 2941-2945 | |
| 87 | Shaili Jain, David C. Parkes: The role of game theory in human computation systems. KDD Workshop on Human Computation 2009: 58-61 | |
| 86 | David F. Bacon, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes, Malvika Rao: A market-based approach to software evolution. OOPSLA Companion 2009: 973-980 | |
| 85 | David C. Parkes: When Analysis Fails: Heuristic Mechanism Design via Self-correcting Procedures. SOFSEM 2009: 62-66 | |
| 84 | Shien Jin Ong, David C. Parkes, Alon Rosen, Salil P. Vadhan: Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority. TCC 2009: 36-53 | |
| 83 | Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes: Quantifying the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms via Metrics on Payoff Distributions. UAI 2009: 349-358 | |
| 82 | Adam I. Juda, David C. Parkes: An options-based solution to the sequential auction problem. Artif. Intell. 173(7-8): 876-899 (2009) | |
| 81 | Saul Youssef, John Brunelle, John Huth, David C. Parkes, Margo I. Seltzer, Jim Shank: Minimal Economic Distributed Computing CoRR abs/0902.4730: (2009) | |
| 80 | Joan Feigenbaum, David C. Parkes, David M. Pennock: Computational challenges in e-commerce. Commun. ACM 52(1): 70-74 (2009) | |
| 79 | Debasis Mishra, David C. Parkes: Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions. Games and Economic Behavior 66(1): 326-347 (2009) | |
| 78 | David C. Parkes, Moshe Tennenholtz: Special Section of Games and Economic Behavior dedicated to the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. Games and Economic Behavior 67(1): 1 (2009) | |
| 2008 | ||
| 77 | Lin Padgham, David C. Parkes, Jörg P. Müller, Simon Parsons: 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2008), Estoril, Portugal, May 12-16, 2008, Volume 1 IFAAMAS 2008 | |
| 76 | Lin Padgham, David C. Parkes, Jörg P. Müller, Simon Parsons: 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2008), Estoril, Portugal, May 12-16, 2008, Volume 2 IFAAMAS 2008 | |
| 75 | Lin Padgham, David C. Parkes, Jörg P. Müller, Simon Parsons: 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2008), Estoril, Portugal, May 12-16, 2008, Volume 3 IFAAMAS 2008 | |
| 74 | Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes, David M. Pennock: An Expressive Auction Design for Online Display Advertising. AAAI 2008: 108-113 | |
| 73 | William E. Walsh, David C. Parkes, Tuomas Sandholm, Craig Boutilier: Computing Reserve Prices and Identifying the Value Distribution in Real-world Auctions with Market Disruptions. AAAI 2008: 1499-1502 | |
| 72 | Sven Seuken, Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes: Partially Synchronized DEC-MDPs in Dynamic Mechanism Design. AAAI 2008: 162-169 | |
| 71 | Haoqi Zhang, David C. Parkes: Value-Based Policy Teaching with Active Indirect Elicitation. AAAI 2008: 208-214 | |
| 70 | Craig Boutilier, David C. Parkes, Tuomas Sandholm, William E. Walsh: Expressive Banner Ad Auctions and Model-Based Online Optimization for Clearing. AAAI 2008: 30-37 | |
| 69 | Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes: Efficient Metadeliberation Auctions. AAAI 2008: 50-56 | |
| 68 | Erik G. Schultink, Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes: Economic Hierarchical Q-Learning. AAAI 2008: 689-695 | |
| 67 | Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes: On the communication requirements of verifying the VCG outcome. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2008: 78-87 | |
| 66 | Mark Klein, Gabriel A. Moreno, David C. Parkes, Daniel Plakosh, Sven Seuken, Kurt C. Wallnau: Handling interdependent values in an auction mechanism for bandwidth allocation in tactical data networks. NetEcon 2008: 73-78 | |
| 65 | Sevan G. Ficici, David C. Parkes, Avi Pfeffer: Learning and Solving Many-Player Games through a Cluster-Based Representation. UAI 2008: 187-195 | |
| 64 | Shaili Jain, David C. Parkes: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Games with a Purpose. WINE 2008: 342-350 | |
| 63 | David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Stuart M. Shieber, Christopher Thorpe: Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications 7(3): 294-312 (2008) | |
| 62 | Shien Jin Ong, David C. Parkes, Alon Rosen, Salil P. Vadhan: Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2008: 97 (2008) | |
| 61 | Adrian Petcu, Boi Faltings, David C. Parkes: M-DPOP: Faithful Distributed Implementation of Efficient Social Choice Problems. J. Artif. Intell. Res. (JAIR) 32: 705-755 (2008) | |
| 60 | Benjamin Lubin, Adam I. Juda, Ruggiero Cavallo, Sébastien Lahaie, Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes: ICE: An Expressive Iterative Combinatorial Exchange. J. Artif. Intell. Res. (JAIR) 33: 33-77 (2008) | |
| 59 | Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes: A modular framework for iterative combinatorial auctions. SIGecom Exchanges 7(2): (2008) | |
| 2007 | ||
| 58 | Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, David C. Parkes, Paul Resnick: Proceedings 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2007), San Diego, California, USA, June 11-15, 2007 ACM 2007 | |
| 57 | David C. Parkes, Quang Duong: An Ironing-Based Approach to Adaptive Online Mechanism Design in Single-Valued Domains. AAAI 2007: 94-101 | |
| 56 | Florin Constantin, Takayuki Ito, David C. Parkes: Online auctions for bidders with interdependent values. AAMAS 2007: 110 | |
| 55 | Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes: On Revenue-Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values. AMEC/TADA 2007: 1-15 | |
| 54 | Christopher Thorpe, David C. Parkes: Cryptographic Securities Exchanges. Financial Cryptography 2007: 163-178 | |
| 53 | Jacomo Corbo, Antoni Calvó-Armengol, David C. Parkes: The Importance of Network Topology in Local Contribution Games. WINE 2007: 388-395 | |
| 52 | Jonathan Bredin, David C. Parkes, Quang Duong: Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching Patient Agents. J. Artif. Intell. Res. (JAIR) 30: 133-179 (2007) | |
| 51 | Debasis Mishra, David C. Parkes: Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations. J. Economic Theory 132(1): 335-366 (2007) | |
| 50 | David C. Parkes, Lin Padgham: AAMAS 2008. KI 21(3): 76 (2007) | |
| 2006 | ||
| 49 | Takayuki Ito, David C. Parkes: Instantiating the contingent bids model of truthful interdependent value auctions. AAMAS 2006: 1151-1158 | |
| 48 | Adrian Petcu, Boi Faltings, David C. Parkes: MDPOP: faithful distributed implementation of efficient social choice problems. AAMAS 2006: 1397-1404 | |
| 47 | Adam I. Juda, David C. Parkes: The sequential auction problem on eBay: an empirical analysis and a solution. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2006: 180-189 | |
| 46 | Laura Kang, David C. Parkes: Passive verification of the strategyproofness of mechanisms in open environments. ICEC 2006: 19-30 | |
| 45 | David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Stuart M. Shieber, C. A. Thorpe: Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions. ICEC 2006: 70-81 | |
| 44 | Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes, Satinder P. Singh: Optimal Coordinated Planning Amongst Self-Interested Agents with Private State. UAI 2006 | |
| 43 | Jacomo Corbo, Antoni Calvó-Armengol, David C. Parkes: A study of Nash equilibrium in contribution games for peer-to-peer networks. Operating Systems Review 40(3): 61-66 (2006) | |
| 2005 | ||
| 42 | Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian, David C. Parkes: Online auctions with re-usable goods. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005: 165-174 | |
| 41 | David C. Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Nick Elprin, Adam I. Juda, Sébastien Lahaie, Benjamin Lubin, Loizos Michael, Jeffrey Shneidman, Hassan Sultan: ICE: an iterative combinatorial exchange. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005: 249-258 | |
| 40 | David C. Parkes: Computational Mechanism Design: An AI Agenda. BNAIC 2005: 3-10 | |
| 39 | Jeffrey Shneidman, Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Alvin AuYoung, Alex C. Snoeren, Amin Vahdat, Brent N. Chun: Why Markets Could (But Don't Currently) Solve Resource Allocation Problems in Systems. HotOS 2005 | |
| 38 | Sébastien Lahaie, Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes: More on the Power of Demand Queries in Combinatorial Auctions: Learning Atomic Languages and Handling Incentives. IJCAI 2005: 959-964 | |
| 37 | Geoffrey Mainland, David C. Parkes, Matt Welsh: Decentralized, Adaptive Resource Allocation for Sensor Networks. NSDI 2005 | |
| 36 | Jacomo Corbo, David C. Parkes: The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation. PODC 2005: 99-107 | |
| 35 | Jonathan Bredin, David C. Parkes: Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions. UAI 2005: 50-59 | |
| 34 | David C. Parkes: Auction design with costly preference elicitation. Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. 44(3): 269-302 (2005) | |
| 33 | David C. Parkes: Special Issue of Decision Support Systems on the Fourth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. Decision Support Systems 39(1): 1-2 (2005) | |
| 32 | Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, Subhash Suri: Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multiunit auctions. Decision Support Systems 39(1): 105-121 (2005) | |
| 31 | David C. Parkes, Jayant Kalagnanam: Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions. Management Science 51(3): 435-451 (2005) | |
| 2004 | ||
| 30 | Peyman Faratin, David C. Parkes, Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar, William E. Walsh: Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V, Designing Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2003 Workshop, AMEC 2003, Melbourne, Australia, July 15, 2003, Revised Selected Papers Springer 2004 | |
| 29 | David C. Parkes, Grant Schoenebeck: GROWRANGE: Anytime VCG-Based Mechanisms. AAAI 2004: 34-41 | |
| 28 | David C. Parkes, Jeffrey Shneidman: Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism. AAMAS 2004: 261-268 | |
| 27 | Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes: Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 180-188 | |
| 26 | Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, David C. Parkes: Adaptive limited-supply online auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 71-80 | |
| 25 | Geoffrey Mainland, Laura Kang, Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes, Matt Welsh: Using virtual markets to program global behavior in sensor networks. ACM SIGOPS European Workshop 2004: 1 | |
| 24 | Loizos Michael, David C. Parkes, Avi Pfeffer: Specifying and Monitoring Market Mechanisms Using Rights and Obligations. AMEC 2004: 188-201 | |
| 23 | Adam I. Juda, David C. Parkes: An Options-Based Method to Solve the Composability Problem in Sequential Auctions. AMEC 2004: 44-58 | |
| 22 | David C. Parkes, Satinder P. Singh, Dimah Yanovsky: Approximately Efficient Online Mechanism Design. NIPS 2004 | |
| 21 | Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes: Specification faithfulness in networks with rational nodes. PODC 2004: 88-97 | |
| 2003 | ||
| 20 | Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, Subhash Suri: Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-unit auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 166-175 | |
| 19 | Aditya V. Sunderam, David C. Parkes: Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 214-215 | |
| 18 | Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Margo I. Seltzer: Virtual worlds: fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 238-239 | |
| 17 | Eric J. Friedman, David C. Parkes: Pricing WiFi at Starbucks: issues in online mechanism design. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 240-241 | |
| 16 | Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes: Using redundancy to improve robustness of distributed mechanism implementations. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 276-277 | |
| 15 | William E. Walsh, David C. Parkes, Rajarshi Das: Choosing Samples to Compute Heuristic-Strategy Nash Equilibrium. AMEC 2003: 109-123 | |
| 14 | Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes: Rationality and Self-Interest in Peer to Peer Networks. IPTPS 2003: 139-148 | |
| 13 | David C. Parkes, Satinder P. Singh: An MDP-Based Approach to Online Mechanism Design. NIPS 2003 | |
| 12 | Rajdeep K. Dash, Nicholas R. Jennings, David C. Parkes: Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms. IEEE Intelligent Systems 18(6): 40-47 (2003) | |
| 2002 | ||
| 11 | Julian A. Padget, Onn Shehory, David C. Parkes, Norman M. Sadeh, William E. Walsh: Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2002 Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce, Bologna, Italy, July 16, 2002, Revised Papers Springer 2002 | |
| 10 | David C. Parkes: Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions. AMEC 2002: 103-122 | |
| 9 | David C. Parkes: Conference report: the third ACM conference on electronic commerce. SIGecom Exchanges 3(1): 57-61 (2002) | |
| 2001 | ||
| 8 | David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar: An auction-based method for decentralized train scheduling. Agents 2001: 43-50 | |
| 7 | David C. Parkes, Jayant Kalagnanam, Marta Eso: Achieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Exchanges. IJCAI 2001: 1161-1168 | |
| 6 | David C. Parkes, Bernardo A. Huberman: Multiagent Cooperative Search for Portfolio Selection. Games and Economic Behavior 35(1-2): 124-165 (2001) | |
| 2000 | ||
| 5 | David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar: Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice. AAAI/IAAI 2000: 74-81 | |
| 4 | David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar: Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment. AAAI/IAAI 2000: 82-89 | |
| 1999 | ||
| 3 | David C. Parkes: iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 1999: 148-157 | |
| 2 | David C. Parkes: Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems. Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce (IJCAI Workshop) 1999: 206-219 | |
| 1998 | ||
| 1 | David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar, Dean P. Foster: Accounting for Cognitive Costs in On-Line Auction Design. AMET 1998: 25-40 | |
Colors in the list of coauthors
Last update Sun Jun 3 16:06:10 2012 CET by the DBLP Team —
Data released under the ODC-BY 1.0 license — See also our legal information page