 | 2011 |
| 8 |  | George J. Mailath,
Wojciech Olszewski:
Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring.
Games and Economic Behavior 71(1): 174-192 (2011) |
| 2009 |
| 7 |  | George J. Mailath:
Reputation Effects.
Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science 2009: 7651-7662 |
| 2008 |
| 6 |  | George J. Mailath,
Georg Nöldeke:
Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection?
J. Economic Theory 140(1): 97-125 (2008) |
| 2007 |
| 5 |  | Martin W. Cripps,
George J. Mailath,
Larry Samuelson:
Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships.
J. Economic Theory 134(1): 287-316 (2007) |
| 2005 |
| 4 |  | George J. Mailath,
Andrew Postlewaite,
Larry Samuelson:
Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria.
Games and Economic Behavior 53(1): 126-140 (2005) |
| 2002 |
| 3 |  | George J. Mailath,
Ichiro Obara,
Tadashi Sekiguchi:
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma.
Games and Economic Behavior 40(1): 99-122 (2002) |
| 2 |  | George J. Mailath,
Stephen Morris:
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring.
J. Economic Theory 102(1): 189-228 (2002) |
| 2001 |
| 1 |  | Harold L. Cole,
George J. Mailath,
Andrew Postlewaite:
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies.
J. Economic Theory 101(2): 333-373 (2001) |