 | 2012 |
|---|
| 27 |       | Shay Kutten,
Ron Lavi,
Amitabh Trehan:
Composition games for distributed systems: The EU grant games (abstract).
INFOCOM Workshops 2012: 170 |
| 26 | | Shahar Dobzinski,
Ron Lavi,
Noam Nisan:
Multi-unit auctions with budget limits.
Games and Economic Behavior 74(2): 486-503 (2012) |
| 2011 |
|---|
| 25 | | Shay Kutten,
Ron Lavi,
Amitabh Trehan:
Brief Announcement: Composition Games for Distributed Systems: The EU Grants Games.
DISC 2011: 197-199 |
| 24 | | Ron Lavi,
Marina May:
A Note on the Incompatibility of Strategy-Proofness and Pareto-Optimality in Quasi-Linear Settings with Public Budgets - Working Paper.
WINE 2011: 417 |
| 23 | | Shay Kutten,
Ron Lavi,
Amitabh Trehan:
Composition Games for Distributed Systems: the EU Grant games
CoRR abs/1105.5255: (2011) |
| 22 | | Ron Lavi,
Chaitanya Swamy:
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming.
J. ACM 58(6): 25 (2011) |
| 2009 |
|---|
| 21 | | Itai Ashlagi,
Shahar Dobzinski,
Ron Lavi:
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2009: 169-176 |
| 20 | | Ron Lavi:
Mechanism Design.
Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science 2009: 5510-5523 |
| 19 | | Ron Lavi,
Chaitanya Swamy:
Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity.
Games and Economic Behavior 67(1): 99-124 (2009) |
| 18 | | Moshe Babaioff,
Ron Lavi,
Elan Pavlov:
Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies.
J. ACM 56(1): (2009) |
| 17 | | Itai Ashlagi,
Shahar Dobzinski,
Ron Lavi:
VCG is the best anonymous scheduling mechanism.
SIGecom Exchanges 8(1): (2009) |
| 16 | | Ron Lavi,
Ahuva Mu'alem,
Noam Nisan:
Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem.
Social Choice and Welfare 32(3): 407-423 (2009) |
| 2008 |
|---|
| 15 | | Shahar Dobzinski,
Ron Lavi,
Noam Nisan:
Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits.
FOCS 2008: 260-269 |
| 14 | | Ron Lavi:
Algorithmic Mechanism Design.
Encyclopedia of Algorithms 2008 |
| 2007 |
|---|
| 13 | | Ron Lavi,
Chaitanya Swamy:
Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2007: 252-261 |
| 12 | | Ron Lavi:
Searching for the possibility: impossibility border of truthful mechanism design.
SIGecom Exchanges 7(1): 25-29 (2007) |
| 2006 |
|---|
| 11 | | Moshe Babaioff,
Ron Lavi,
Elan Pavlov:
Impersonation-Based Mechanisms.
AAAI 2006: 592-597 |
| 10 | | Moshe Babaioff,
Ron Lavi,
Elan Pavlov:
Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies.
SODA 2006: 1054-1063 |
| 2005 |
|---|
| 9 |  | Moshe Babaioff,
Ron Lavi,
Elan Pavlov:
Mechanism Design for Single-Value Domains.
AAAI 2005: 241-247 |
| 8 | | Ron Lavi,
Chaitanya Swamy:
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming.
FOCS 2005: 595-604 |
| 7 | | Ron Lavi,
Noam Nisan:
Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items.
SODA 2005: 1146-1155 |
| 2004 |
|---|
| 6 | | Yair Bartal,
Francis Y. L. Chin,
Marek Chrobak,
Stanley P. Y. Fung,
Wojciech Jawor,
Ron Lavi,
Jiri Sgall,
Tomás Tichý:
Online Competitive Algorithms for Maximizing Weighted Throughput of Unit Jobs.
STACS 2004: 187-198 |
| 5 | | Ron Lavi,
Noam Nisan:
Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions.
Theor. Comput. Sci. 310(1-3): 159-180 (2004) |
| 2003 |
|---|
| 4 | | Ron Lavi,
Ahuva Mu'alem,
Noam Nisan:
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions.
FOCS 2003: 574-583 |
| 2001 |
|---|
| 3 | | Ron Lavi,
Amnon Barak:
The Home Model and Competitive Algorithms for Load Balancing in a Computing Cluster.
ICDCS 2001: 127-134 |
| 2000 |
|---|
| 2 | | Ron Lavi,
Noam Nisan:
Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2000: 233-241 |
| 1998 |
|---|
| 1 | | Ron Lavi,
Amnon Barak:
Improving the PVM Daemon Network Performance by Direct Network Access.
PVM/MPI 1998: 44-51 |
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