 | 2012 |
|---|
| 53 |       | Arthur Carvalho,
Kate Larson:
A Consensual Linear Opinion Pool
CoRR abs/1204.5399: (2012) |
| 52 | | Arthur Carvalho,
Kate Larson:
On a Reliable Peer-Review Process
CoRR abs/1204.5963: (2012) |
| 2011 |
|---|
| 51 | | Greg Hines,
Kate Larson:
Efficiently Eliciting Preferences from a Group of Users.
Interactive Decision Theory and Game Theory 2011 |
| 50 | | Simina Brânzei,
Kate Larson:
Social distance games.
AAMAS 2011: 1281-1282 |
| 49 | | Arthur Carvalho,
Kate Larson:
A truth serum for sharing rewards.
AAMAS 2011: 635-642 |
| 48 | | Greg Hines,
Kate Larson:
Efficiently Eliciting Preferences from a Group of Users.
ADT 2011: 96-107 |
| 47 | | Simina Brânzei,
Kate Larson:
Social Distance Games.
IJCAI 2011: 91-96 |
| 46 | | Sebastian Stein,
Enrico H. Gerding,
Alex Rogers,
Kate Larson,
Nicholas R. Jennings:
Algorithms and mechanisms for procuring services with uncertain durations using redundancy.
Artif. Intell. 175(14-15): 2021-2060 (2011) |
| 45 | | Iyad Rahwan,
Kate Larson:
Logical mechanism design.
Knowledge Eng. Review 26(1): 61-69 (2011) |
| 2010 |
|---|
| 44 | | Zinovi Rabinovich,
Lachlan Dufton,
Kate Larson,
Nicholas R. Jennings:
Cultivating desired behaviour: policy teaching via environment-dynamics tweaks.
AAMAS 2010: 1097-1104 |
| 43 | | Arthur Carvalho,
Kate Larson:
Sharing a reward based on peer evaluations.
AAMAS 2010: 1455-1456 |
| 42 | | David Loker,
Kate Larson:
An investigation of representations of combinatorial auctions.
AAMAS 2010: 1481-1482 |
| 41 | | David Loker,
Kate Larson:
Parameterizing the winner determination problem for combinatorial auctions.
AAMAS 2010: 1483-1484 |
| 40 | | Enrico Gerding,
Sebastian Stein,
Kate Larson,
Alex Rogers,
Nicholas R. Jennings:
Scalable mechanism design for the procurement of services with uncertain durations.
AAMAS 2010: 649-656 |
| 39 | | Greg Hines,
Kate Larson:
Preference elicitation for risky prospects.
AAMAS 2010: 889-896 |
| 38 | | Shengying Pan,
Kate Larson,
Iyad Rahwan:
Argumentation Mechanism Design for Preferred Semantics.
COMMA 2010: 403-414 |
| 37 | | Jie Zhang,
Robin Cohen,
Kate Larson:
Leveraging a Social Network of Trust for Promoting Honesty in E-Marketplaces.
IFIPTM 2010: 216-231 |
| 36 | | Martin Macko,
Kate Larson,
L'ubos Steskal:
Braess's Paradox for Flows over Time.
SAGT 2010: 262-275 |
| 35 | | Martin Macko,
Kate Larson,
L'ubos Steskal:
Braess's Paradox for Flows Over Time
CoRR abs/1007.4864: (2010) |
| 2009 |
|---|
| 34 | | Enrico H. Gerding,
Alex Rogers,
Kate Larson,
Nick R. Jennings:
Mechanism design for task procurement with flexible quality of service.
AAMAS (2) 2009: 1259-1260 |
| 33 | | Simina Brânzei,
Kate Larson:
Coalitional affinity games.
AAMAS (2) 2009: 1319-1320 |
| 32 | | Greg Hines,
Kate Larson:
Insuring Risk-Averse Agents.
ADT 2009: 294-305 |
| 31 | | Georgia Kastidou,
Kate Larson,
Robin Cohen:
Exchanging Reputation Information between Communities: A Payment-Function Approach.
IJCAI 2009: 195-200 |
| 30 | | Iyad Rahwan,
Kate Larson,
Fernando A. Tohmé:
A Characterisation of Strategy-Proofness for Grounded Argumentation Semantics.
IJCAI 2009: 251-256 |
| 29 | | Sebastian Stein,
Enrico Gerding,
Alex Rogers,
Kate Larson,
Nicholas R. Jennings:
Flexible Procurement of Services with Uncertain Durations using Redundancy.
IJCAI 2009: 292-298 |
| 28 | | Simina Brânzei,
Kate Larson:
Coalitional Affinity Games and the Stability Gap.
IJCAI 2009: 79-84 |
| 27 | | Enrico H. Gerding,
Kate Larson,
Alex Rogers,
Nicholas R. Jennings:
Mechanism Design for Task Procurement with Flexible Quality of Service.
SOCASE 2009: 12-23 |
| 26 | | Jeremy Clark,
Urs Hengartner,
Kate Larson:
Not-So Hidden Information: Optimal Contracts for Undue Influence in E2E Voting Systems.
VOTE-ID 2009: 1-17 |
| 2008 |
|---|
| 25 |  | Iyad Rahwan,
Kate Larson:
Pareto Optimality in Abstract Argumentation.
AAAI 2008: 150-155 |
| 24 | | Iyad Rahwan,
Kate Larson:
Mechanism design for abstract argumentation.
AAMAS (2) 2008: 1031-1038 |
| 23 | | Greg Hines,
Kate Larson:
Using adaptive consultation of experts to improve convergence rates in multiagent learning.
AAMAS (3) 2008: 1337-1340 |
| 22 | | Jie Zhang,
Robin Cohen,
Kate Larson:
A Trust-Based Incentive Mechanism for E-Marketplaces.
AAMAS-TRUST 2008: 135-161 |
| 21 | | Greg Hines,
Kate Larson:
Learning When to Take Advice: A Statistical Test for Achieving A Correlated Equilibrium.
UAI 2008: 274-281 |
| 2007 |
|---|
| 20 | | Yunqi Zhang,
Kate Larson:
Reducing Interaction Costs for Self-interested Agents.
AMEC/TADA 2007: 166-181 |
| 19 | | Kate Larson:
Reducing Costly Information Acquisition in Auctions.
Computational Social Systems and the Internet 2007 |
| 2006 |
|---|
| 18 | | Kate Larson:
Reducing costly information acquisition in auctions.
AAMAS 2006: 1167-1174 |
| 17 | | Elodie Fourquet,
Kate Larson,
William Cowan:
A reputation mechanism for layered communities.
SIGecom Exchanges 6(1): 11-22 (2006) |
| 2005 |
|---|
| 16 | | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Mechanism design and deliberative agents.
AAMAS 2005: 650-656 |
| 15 | | Shahram Esmaeilsabzali,
Kate Larson:
Service Allocation for Composite Web Services Based on Quality Attributes.
CEC Workshops 2005: 71-82 |
| 2004 |
|---|
| 14 | | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Using Performance Profile Trees to Improve Deliberation Control.
AAAI 2004: 73-79 |
| 13 | | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Experiments on Deliberation Equilibria in Auctions.
AAMAS 2004: 394-401 |
| 12 | | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Strategic deliberation and truthful revelation: an impossibility result.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 264-265 |
| 11 | | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Designing Auctions for Deliberative Agents.
AMEC 2004: 87-100 |
| 2003 |
|---|
| 10 | | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Miscomputing ratio: social cost of selfish computing.
AAMAS 2003: 273-280 |
| 2002 |
|---|
| 9 | | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
An alternating offers bargaining model for computationally limited agents.
AAMAS 2002: 135-142 |
| 8 | | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Bidders with hard valuation problems.
AAMAS 2002: 160-161 |
| 2001 |
|---|
| 7 | | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium.
Artif. Intell. 132(2): 183-217 (2001) |
| 2000 |
|---|
| 6 | | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Deliberation in Equilibrium: Bargaining in Computationally Complex Problems.
AAAI/IAAI 2000: 48-55 |
| 5 | | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Anytime coalition structure generation: an average case study.
J. Exp. Theor. Artif. Intell. 12(1): 23-42 (2000) |
| 1999 |
|---|
| 4 | | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Anytime Coalition Structure Generation: An Average Case Study.
Agents 1999: 40-47 |
| 3 | | Tuomas Sandholm,
Kate Larson,
Martin Andersson,
Onn Shehory,
Fernando Tohmé:
Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees.
Artif. Intell. 111(1-2): 209-238 (1999) |
| 1998 |
|---|
| 2 | | Tuomas Sandholm,
Kate Larson,
Martin Andersson,
Onn Shehory,
Fernando Tohmé:
Anytime Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees.
AAAI/IAAI 1998: 46-53 |
| 1 | | Tuomas Sandholm,
Kate Larson,
Martin Andersson,
Onn Shehory,
Fernando Tohmé:
Anytime Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees
CoRR cs.MA/9810005: (1998) |
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