 | 2012 |
| 42 |  | Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru,
Shahar Dobzinski,
Hu Fu,
Robert Kleinberg,
Noam Nisan,
Tim Roughgarden:
Sketching valuation functions.
SODA 2012: 1025-1035 |
| 41 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Jan Vondrák:
From query complexity to computational complexity.
STOC 2012: 1107-1116 |
| 40 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Jan Vondrák:
The Computational Complexity of Truthfulness in Combinatorial Auctions
CoRR abs/1202.2789: (2012) |
| 39 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Jan Vondrák:
On the Hardness of Welfare Maximization in Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations
CoRR abs/1202.2792: (2012) |
| 38 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Ron Lavi,
Noam Nisan:
Multi-unit auctions with budget limits.
Games and Economic Behavior 74(2): 486-503 (2012) |
| 37 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Noam Nisan,
Michael Schapira:
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions.
J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 78(1): 15-25 (2012) |
| 2011 |
| 36 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Noam Nisan:
Multi-unit auctions: beyond roberts.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2011: 233-242 |
| 35 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Christos H. Papadimitriou,
Yaron Singer:
Mechanisms for complement-free procurement.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2011: 273-282 |
| 34 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Hu Fu,
Robert D. Kleinberg:
Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy.
STOC 2011: 129-138 |
| 33 |  | Shahar Dobzinski:
An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations.
STOC 2011: 139-148 |
| 32 |  | Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru,
Shahar Dobzinski,
Sigal Oren:
Optimization with Demand Oracles
CoRR abs/1107.2869: (2011) |
| 31 |  | Moshe Babaioff,
Shahar Dobzinski,
Sigal Oren,
Aviv Zohar:
On Bitcoin and Red Balloons
CoRR abs/1111.2626: (2011) |
| 30 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Noam Nisan:
Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms.
Combinatorica 31(4): 379-396 (2011) |
| 29 |  | Peerapong Dhangwatnotai,
Shahar Dobzinski,
Shaddin Dughmi,
Tim Roughgarden:
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents.
SIAM J. Comput. 40(3): 915-933 (2011) |
| 2010 |
| 28 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Noam Nisan:
Multi-Unit Auctions: Beyond Roberts
CoRR abs/1004.1449: (2010) |
| 27 |  | Shahar Dobzinski:
An Impossibility Result for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations
CoRR abs/1011.1830: (2010) |
| 26 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Hu Fu,
Robert Kleinberg:
Optimal Auctions with Correlated Bidders are Easy
CoRR abs/1011.2413: (2010) |
| 25 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Hu Fu,
Robert Kleinberg:
Truthfulness via Proxies
CoRR abs/1011.3232: (2010) |
| 24 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Noam Nisan:
Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Auctions.
J. Artif. Intell. Res. (JAIR) 37: 85-98 (2010) |
| 23 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Noam Nisan,
Michael Schapira:
Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders.
Math. Oper. Res. 35(1): 1-13 (2010) |
| 2009 |
| 22 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Shahar Dobzinski,
Ron Lavi:
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2009: 169-176 |
| 21 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Shaddin Dughmi:
On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design.
FOCS 2009: 505-514 |
| 20 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Noam Nisan:
A Modular Approach to Roberts' Theorem.
SAGT 2009: 14-23 |
| 19 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Shaddin Dughmi:
On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
CoRR abs/0904.4193: (2009) |
| 18 |  | Shahar Dobzinski:
A Note on the Power of Truthful Approximation Mechanisms
CoRR abs/0907.5219: (2009) |
| 17 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Shahar Dobzinski,
Ron Lavi:
VCG is the best anonymous scheduling mechanism.
SIGecom Exchanges 8(1): (2009) |
| 2008 |
| 16 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Mukund Sundararajan:
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2008: 38-47 |
| 15 |  | Peerapong Dhangwatnotai,
Shahar Dobzinski,
Shaddin Dughmi,
Tim Roughgarden:
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents.
FOCS 2008: 15-24 |
| 14 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Ron Lavi,
Noam Nisan:
Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits.
FOCS 2008: 260-269 |
| 13 |  | Richard Cole,
Shahar Dobzinski,
Lisa Fleischer:
Prompt Mechanisms for Online Auctions.
SAGT 2008: 170-181 |
| 12 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Aranyak Mehta,
Tim Roughgarden,
Mukund Sundararajan:
Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?
SAGT 2008: 327-336 |
| 11 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Ariel D. Procaccia:
Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters.
WINE 2008: 653-664 |
| 2007 |
| 10 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Noam Nisan:
Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2007: 346-351 |
| 9 |  | Shahar Dobzinski:
Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions.
APPROX-RANDOM 2007: 89-103 |
| 8 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Noam Nisan:
Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms.
STOC 2007: 338-344 |
| 7 |  | Liad Blumrosen,
Shahar Dobzinski:
Welfare Maximization in Congestion Games.
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 25(6): 1224-1236 (2007) |
| 6 |  | Shahar Dobzinski:
Better mechanisms for combinatorial auctions via maximal-in-range algorithms?
SIGecom Exchanges 7(1): 30-33 (2007) |
| 2006 |
| 5 |  | Liad Blumrosen,
Shahar Dobzinski:
Welfare maximization in congestion games.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2006: 52-61 |
| 4 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Michael Schapira:
An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders.
SODA 2006: 1064-1073 |
| 3 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Noam Nisan,
Michael Schapira:
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions.
STOC 2006: 644-652 |
| 2 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Noam Nisan:
Approximations by Computationally-Efficient VCG-Based Mechanisms.
Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC) 13(074): (2006) |
| 2005 |
| 1 |  | Shahar Dobzinski,
Noam Nisan,
Michael Schapira:
Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders.
STOC 2005: 610-618 |