 | 2012 |
| 23 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Emin Karagözoglu,
Bettina Klaus:
A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems.
Mathematical Social Sciences 63(3): 228-233 (2012) |
| 22 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Shigehiro Serizawa:
Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity.
Social Choice and Welfare 38(3): 531-542 (2012) |
| 2011 |
| 21 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Alvin Roth:
Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2011: 321-322 |
| 20 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Mark Braverman,
Avinatan Hassidim:
Matching with couples revisited.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2011: 335-336 |
| 19 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Dov Monderer,
Moshe Tennenholtz:
Simultaneous Ad Auctions.
Math. Oper. Res. 36(1): 1-13 (2011) |
| 2010 |
| 18 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Moshe Tennenholtz,
Aviv Zohar:
Competing Schedulers.
AAAI 2010 |
| 17 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Felix A. Fischer,
Ian A. Kash,
Ariel D. Procaccia:
Mix and match.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2010: 305-314 |
| 16 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Felix A. Fischer,
Ian A. Kash,
Ariel D. Procaccia:
Mix and Match
CoRR abs/1006.1881: (2010) |
| 15 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Mark Braverman,
Avinatan Hassidim:
Matching with Couples Revisited
CoRR abs/1011.2121: (2010) |
| 2009 |
| 14 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Shahar Dobzinski,
Ron Lavi:
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2009: 169-176 |
| 13 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Dov Monderer,
Moshe Tennenholtz:
Two-terminal routing games with unknown active players.
Artif. Intell. 173(15): 1441-1455 (2009) |
| 12 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Dov Monderer,
Moshe Tennenholtz:
Mediators in position auctions.
Games and Economic Behavior 67(1): 2-21 (2009) |
| 11 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Shahar Dobzinski,
Ron Lavi:
VCG is the best anonymous scheduling mechanism.
SIGecom Exchanges 8(1): (2009) |
| 2008 |
| 10 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Piotr Krysta,
Moshe Tennenholtz:
Social Context Games.
WINE 2008: 675-683 |
| 9 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Dov Monderer,
Moshe Tennenholtz:
On the Value of Correlation.
J. Artif. Intell. Res. (JAIR) 33: 575-613 (2008) |
| 2007 |
| 8 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Dov Monderer,
Moshe Tennenholtz:
Learning Equilibrium in Resource Selection Games.
AAAI 2007: 18-23 |
| 7 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Dov Monderer,
Moshe Tennenholtz:
Routing games with an unknown set of active players.
AAMAS 2007: 195 |
| 6 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Dov Monderer,
Moshe Tennenholtz:
Mediators in position auctions.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2007: 279-287 |
| 5 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Andrey Klinger,
Moshe Tennenholtz:
K-NCC: Stability Against Group Deviations in Non-cooperative Computation.
WINE 2007: 564-569 |
| 2006 |
| 4 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Dov Monderer,
Moshe Tennenholtz:
Resource selection games with unknown number of players.
AAMAS 2006: 819-825 |
| 3 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Moshe Tennenholtz,
Dov Monderer:
Robust Learning Equilibrium.
UAI 2006 |
| 2005 |
| 2 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Dov Monderer,
Moshe Tennenholtz:
The Value of Correlation in Strategic Form Games.
Computing and Markets 2005 |
| 1 |  | Itai Ashlagi,
Dov Monderer,
Moshe Tennenholtz:
On the Value of Correlation.
UAI 2005: 34-41 |