5. WINE 2009:
Rome,
Italy
Stefano Leonardi (Ed.):
Internet and Network Economics, 5th International Workshop, WINE 2009, Rome, Italy, December 14-18, 2009. Proceedings.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 5929 Springer 2009, ISBN 978-3-642-10840-2
Invited Talks
Regular Papers
- Martin Hoefer, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Heiko Röglin, Shang-Hua Teng:
Competitive Routing over Time.
18-29
- Pinyan Lu:
On 2-Player Randomized Mechanisms for Scheduling.
30-41
- Patrick Briest, Martin Hoefer, Luciano Gualà, Carmine Ventre:
On Stackelberg Pricing with Computationally Bounded Consumers.
42-54
- Angelo Fanelli, Luca Moscardelli:
On Best Response Dynamics in Weighted Congestion Games with Polynomial Delays.
55-66
- Leah Epstein, Elena Kleiman, Julián Mestre:
Parametric Packing of Selfish Items and the Subset Sum Algorithm.
67-78
- Sourav Chakraborty, Nikhil R. Devanur:
An Online Multi-unit Auction with Improved Competitive Ratio.
79-88
- Peng Shi, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo:
Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions.
89-100
- David Arthur, Rajeev Motwani, Aneesh Sharma, Ying Xu:
Pricing Strategies for Viral Marketing on Social Networks.
101-112
- Ola Rozenfeld, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Consistent Continuous Trust-Based Recommendation Systems.
113-124
- Jean Cardinal, Erik D. Demaine, Samuel Fiorini, Gwenaël Joret, Ilan Newman, Oren Weimann:
The Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree Game on Planar and Bounded-Treewidth Graphs.
125-136
- Pinyan Lu, Yajun Wang, Yuan Zhou:
Tighter Bounds for Facility Games.
137-148
- Claudia Lindner, Jörg Rothe:
Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness in Finite Bounded Cake-Cutting Protocols.
149-159
- Thành Nguyen, Éva Tardos:
Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria via Lovász Local Lemma.
160-171
- Renato Gomes, Nicole Immorlica, Evangelos Markakis:
Externalities in Keyword Auctions: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment.
172-183
- Martin Gairing:
Covering Games: Approximation through Non-cooperation.
184-195
- Sharad Goel, Sébastien Lahaie, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
Contract Auctions for Sponsored Search.
196-207
- Arpita Ghosh, Randolph Preston McAfee, Kishore Papineni, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
Bidding for Representative Allocations for Display Advertising.
208-219
- Esteban Arcaute, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
Social Networks and Stable Matchings in the Job Market.
220-231
- Leah Epstein, Elena Kleiman, Rob van Stee:
Maximizing the Minimum Load: The Cost of Selfishness.
232-243
- Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer, Daniel M. Reeves:
Competitive Repeated Allocation without Payments.
244-255
- Paolo Penna, Florian Schoppmann, Riccardo Silvestri, Peter Widmayer:
Pseudonyms in Cost-Sharing Games.
256-267
- Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman:
Computing Optimal Contracts in Series-Parallel Heterogeneous Combinatorial Agencies.
268-279
- Rainer Feldmann, Marios Mavronicolas, Burkhard Monien:
Nash Equilibria for Voronoi Games on Transitive Graphs.
280-291
- Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot, Orestis Telelis:
Selfish Scheduling with Setup Times.
292-303
- Nithum Thain, Adrian Vetta:
Computational Aspects of Multimarket Price Wars.
304-315
- Dimitris Fotakis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexis C. Kaporis, Paul G. Spirakis:
The Impact of Social Ignorance on Weighted Congestion Games.
316-327
- Christopher A. Wilkens:
The Complexity of Models of International Trade.
328-339
- Angelina Vidali:
The Geometry of Truthfulness.
340-350
- Michal Feldman, Ran Tessler, Yoav Wilf:
Optimal Incentives for Participation with Type-Dependent Externalities.
351-361
- Anand Bhalgat, Tanmoy Chakraborty, Sanjeev Khanna:
Nash Dynamics in Congestion Games with Similar Resources.
362-373
- Jon Feldman, Nitish Korula, Vahab S. Mirrokni, S. Muthukrishnan, Martin Pál:
Online Ad Assignment with Free Disposal.
374-385
- Devansh Dikshit, Yadati Narahari:
Truthful and Quality Conscious Query Incentive Networks.
386-397
- Saeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian:
An Analysis of Troubled Assets Reverse Auction.
398-409
- Xiaotie Deng, Qi Qi, Jie Zhang:
Direction Preserving Zero Point Computing and Applications.
410-421
Short Papers
- Vijay V. Vazirani, Lei Wang:
Continuity Properties of Equilibria in Some Fisher and Arrow-Debreu Market Models.
422-429
- Joud Khoury, Chaouki T. Abdallah, Kate Krause, Jorge Crichigno:
Route Distribution Incentives.
430-437
- Haris Aziz, Oded Lachish, Mike Paterson, Rahul Savani:
Wiretapping a Hidden Network.
438-446
- Ning Chen, Edith Elkind, Nick Gravin:
Refining the Cost of Cheap Labor in Set System Auctions.
447-454
- Josep Díaz, Dieter Mitsche, Navin Rustagi, Jared Saia:
On the Power of Mediators.
455-462
- Tobias Harks, Max Klimm, Rolf H. Möhring:
Strong Nash Equilibria in Games with the Lexicographical Improvement Property.
463-470
- Ilan Adler, Constantinos Daskalakis, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
A Note on Strictly Competitive Games.
471-474
- Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou:
The Efficiency of Fair Division.
475-482
- Krzysztof R. Apt, Evangelos Markakis:
Sequential Bidding in the Bailey-Cavallo Mechanism.
483-490
- Stanko Dimitrov, Rahul Sami, Marina Epelman:
Subsidized Prediction Markets for Risk Averse Traders.
491-497
- Amos Fiat, Amiram Wingarten:
Envy, Multi Envy, and Revenue Maximization.
498-504
- Jacomo Corbo, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik:
Nudging Mechanisms for Technology Adoption.
505-512
- Ravi Kumar, Mohammad Mahdian, Amin Sayedi:
Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders.
513-520
- Xiaotie Deng, Qi Qi:
Priority Right Auction for Komi Setting.
521-528
- B. V. Ashwinkumar, Robert Kleinberg:
Randomized Online Algorithms for the Buyback Problem.
529-536
- David Kempe, Ahuva Mu'alem, Mahyar Salek:
Envy-Free Allocations for Budgeted Bidders.
537-544
- Arash Asadpour, Amin Saberi:
On the Inefficiency Ratio of Stable Equilibria in Congestion Games.
545-552
- Xi Alice Gao, Yiling Chen, David M. Pennock:
Betting on the Real Line.
553-560
- Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo:
Characterization of Strategy-Proof, Revenue Monotone Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms and Connection with False-Name-Proofness.
561-568
- Dömötör Pálvölgyi:
2D-TUCKER Is PPAD-Complete.
569-574
- Paul Dütting, Monika Rauch Henzinger, Ingmar Weber:
Bidder Optimal Assignments for General Utilities.
575-582
- Xiaotie Deng, Jiajin Yu:
A New Ranking Scheme of the GSP Mechanism with Markovian Users.
583-590
- Joshua R. Davis, David Liben-Nowell, Alexa Sharp, Tom Wexler:
Mediated Equilibria in Load-Balancing Games.
591-599
- Thomas Voice, Maria Polukarov, Andrew Byde, Nicholas R. Jennings:
On the Impact of Strategy and Utility Structures on Congestion-Averse Games.
600-607
- Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot:
On Strong Equilibria in the Max Cut Game.
608-615
- Martin Hoefer, Alexander Skopalik:
Stability and Convergence in Selfish Scheduling with Altruistic Agents.
616-622
- Qianya Lin, Yiling Chen:
Gaming Dynamic Parimutuel Markets.
623-631
- Mangesh Gupte, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Lu Han, Liviu Iftode, Pravin Shankar, Raluca M. Ursu:
News Posting by Strategic Users in a Social Network.
632-639
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