Invited Talks

• 
  Kenneth J. Arrow: Getting to Economic Equilibrium: A Problem and Its History. 1-2
• 
  Herbert E. Scarf: My Favorite Simplicial Complex and Some of Its Applications. 3
• 
  Vijay V. Vazirani: Markets and the Primal-Dual Paradigm. 4
• 
  Christos H. Papadimitriou: The Computation of Equilibria. 5-6

Equilibrium

• 
  Lihua Chen, Yinyu Ye, Jiawei Zhang: A Note on Equilibrium Pricing as Convex Optimization. 7-16
• 
  Hartwig Bosse, Jaroslaw Byrka, Evangelos Markakis: New Algorithms for Approximate Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix Games. 17-29
• 
  Heiner Ackermann, Paul W. Goldberg, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Heiko Röglin, Berthold Vöcking: A Unified Approach to Congestion Games and Two-Sided Markets. 30-41
• 
  Haralampos Tsaknakis, Paul G. Spirakis: An Optimization Approach for Approximate Nash Equilibria. 42-56
• 
  Andrew Gilpin, Samid Hoda, Javier Peña, Tuomas Sandholm: Gradient-Based Algorithms for Finding Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form Games. 57-69

Information Market

• 
  Yiling Chen, Daniel M. Reeves, David M. Pennock, Robin D. Hanson, Lance Fortnow, Rica Gonen: Bluffing and Strategic Reticence in Prediction Markets. 70-81
• 
  Mark Peters, Anthony Man-Cho So, Yinyu Ye: Pari-Mutuel Markets: Mechanisms and Performance. 82-95
• 
  Gabrielle Demange: Information Sharing Communities. 96-107

Sponsored Auction

• 
  Danny Kuminov, Moshe Tennenholtz: Competitive Safety Strategies in Position Auctions. 108-118
• 
  Jennifer Wortman, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Lihong Li, John Langford: Maintaining Equilibria During Exploration in Sponsored Search Auctions. 119-130
• 
  S. Muthukrishnan, Martin Pál, Zoya Svitkina: Stochastic Models for Budget Optimization in Search-Based Advertising. 131-142
• 
  Zoë Abrams, Arpita Ghosh: Auctions with Revenue Guarantees for Sponsored Search. 143-154
• 
  Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Daniel M. Reeves: Equilibrium Analysis of Dynamic Bidding in Sponsored Search Auctions. 155-166
• 
  Li Liang, Qi Qi: Cooperative or Vindictive: Bidding Strategies in Sponsored Search Auction. 167-178

Network Economics

• 
  Dimitris Fotakis, Paul G. Spirakis: Cost-Balancing Tolls for Atomic Network Congestion Games. 179-190
• 
  Esteban Arcaute, Ramesh Johari, Shie Mannor: Network Formation: Bilateral Contracting and Myopic Dynamics. 191-207
• 
  Heiner Ackermann, Patrick Briest, Alexander Fanghänel, Berthold Vöcking: Who Should Pay for Forwarding Packets? 208-219
• 
  Aristotelis Giannakos, Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot, Vangelis Th. Paschos: On the Performance of Congestion Games for Optimum Satisfiability Problems. 220-231
• 
  Alexander Hall, Evdokia Nikolova, Christos H. Papadimitriou: Incentive-Compatible Interdomain Routing with Linear Utilities. 232-244

Mechanism Design I

• 
  Atsushi Iwasaki, David Kempe, Yasumasa Saito, Mahyar Salek, Makoto Yokoo: False-Name-Proof Mechanisms for Hiring a Team. 245-256
• 
  Arpita Ghosh, Mohammad Mahdian, Daniel M. Reeves, David M. Pennock, Ryan Fugger: Mechanism Design on Trust Networks. 257-268
• 
  Samuel Ieong, Anthony Man-Cho So, Mukund Sundararajan: Stochastic Mechanism Design. 269-280

Social Networks

• 
  Eyal Even-Dar, Asaf Shapira: A Note on Maximizing the Spread of Influence in Social Networks. 281-286
• 
  Yair Halevi, Yishay Mansour: A Network Creation Game with Nonuniform Interests. 287-292
• 
  Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, T.-H. Hubert Chan, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi: A Theory of Loss-Leaders: Making Money by Pricing Below Cost. 293-299
• 
  Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer: PageRank as a Weak Tournament Solution. 300-305
• 
  Shishir Bharathi, David Kempe, Mahyar Salek: Competitive Influence Maximization in Social Networks. 306-311

Advertisement Pricing I

• 
  Eyal Even-Dar, Michael J. Kearns, Jennifer Wortman: Sponsored Search with Contexts. 312-317
• 
  Sudhir Kumar Singh, Vwani P. Roychowdhury, Himawan Gunadhi, Behnam Attaran Rezaei: Capacity Constraints and the Inevitability of Mediators in Adword Auctions. 318-325
• 
  Zoë Abrams, Arpita Ghosh, Erik Vee: Cost of Conciseness in Sponsored Search Auctions. 326-334
• 
  Gagan Goel, Aranyak Mehta: Adwords Auctions with Decreasing Valuation Bids. 335-340
• 
  Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov: An Adaptive Sponsored Search Mechanism delta -Gain Truthful in Valuation, Time, and Budget. 341-346

Computational General Equilibrium

• 
  Benton McCune: Extending Polynomial Time Computability to Markets with Demand Correspondences. 347-355
• 
  Rahul Garg, Sanjiv Kapoor: Market Equilibrium Using Auctions for a Class of Gross-Substitute Utilities. 356-361
• 
  Nimrod Megiddo, Vijay V. Vazirani: Continuity Properties of Equilibrium Prices and Allocations in Linear Fisher Markets. 362-367
• 
  Chinmay Karande, Nikhil R. Devanur: Computing Market Equilibrium: Beyond Weak Gross Substitutes. 368-373
• 
  Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Nikhil R. Devanur: On Competitiveness in Uniform Utility Allocation Markets. 374-380

Network Games

• 
  Martin Gairing, Florian Schoppmann: Total Latency in Singleton Congestion Games. 381-387
• 
  Jacomo Corbo, Antoni Calvó-Armengol, David C. Parkes: The Importance of Network Topology in Local Contribution Games. 388-395
• 
  Kurt Nielsen, Tomas Toft: Secure Relative Performance Scheme. 396-403
• 
  Stefania Di Giannantonio, Michele Flammini, Gianpiero Monaco, Luca Moscardelli, Mordechai Shalom, Shmuel Zaks: Selfishness, Collusion and Power of Local Search for the ADMs Minimization Problem. 404-411
• 
  Mohammad Hossein Falaki: The Wi-Fi Roaming Game. 412-418

Algorithmic Issues

• 
  Heiner Ackermann, Alexander Skopalik: On the Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria in Player-Specific Network Congestion Games. 419-430
• 
  David J. Abraham, Ariel Levavi, David Manlove, Gregg O'Malley: The Stable Roommates Problem with Globally-Ranked Pairs. 431-444
• 
  Kyle W. Burke, Shang-Hua Teng: A PSPACE-complete Sperner Triangle Game. 445-456
• 
  Ola Rozenfeld, Moshe Tennenholtz: Group Dominant Strategies. 457-468
• 
  Marios Mavronicolas, Burkhard Monien, Klaus W. Wagner: Weighted Boolean Formula Games. 469-481
• 
  Qizhi Fang, Liang Kong: Core Stability of Vertex Cover Games. 482-490

Mechanism Design II

• 
  Edith Elkind, S. Shaheen Fatima: Maximizing Revenue in Sequential Auctions. 491-502
• 
  Davide Bilò, Luca Forlizzi, Luciano Gualà, Guido Proietti: Approximate Mechanisms for the Graphical TSP and Other Graph Traversal Problems. 503-514
• 
  Yvonne Bleischwitz, Burkhard Monien, Florian Schoppmann: To Be or Not to Be (Served). 515-528

Advertisement Pricing II

• 
  Zoë Abrams, Michael Schwarz: Ad Auction Design and User Experience. 529-534
• 
  Zoë Abrams, Erik Vee: Personalized Ad Delivery When Ads Fatigue: An Approximation Algorithm. 535-540
• 
  Kuzman Ganchev, Alex Kulesza, Jinsong Tan, Ryan Gabbard, Qian Liu, Michael Kearns: Empirical Price Modeling for Sponsored Search. 541-548
• 
  Mohammad Mahdian, Kerem Tomak: Pay-per-action Model for Online Advertising. 549-557
• 
  Atish Das Sarma, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Sreenivas Gollapudi: Public Advertisement Broker Markets. 558-563

Mechanism Design III

• 
  Itai Ashlagi, Andrey Klinger, Moshe Tennenholtz: K-NCC: Stability Against Group Deviations in Non-cooperative Computation. 564-569
• 
  Aries Wei Sun: Monotone Properties of Randomized Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions. 570-575
• 
  Arpita Ghosh, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Mukund Sundararajan: Computing Optimal Bundles for Sponsored Search. 576-583
• 
  Qiqi Yan: On the Price of Truthfulness in Path Auctions. 584-589
• 
  Mira Gonen, Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov: Characterizing Truthful Market Design. 590-595

last updated on Sat May 18 05:44:02 2013 by the dblp team
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