13. ACM-EC 2012: Valencia, Spain
Boi Faltings, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Panos Ipeirotis (Eds.): ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC '12, Valencia, Spain, June 4-8, 2012. ACM 2012 ISBN 978-1-4503-1415-2
Technical presentations papers
- Vibhanshu Abhishek, Kartik Hosanagar, Peter S. Fader: On aggregation bias in sponsored search data: existence andimplications. 1
- Vibhanshu Abhishek, Kartik Hosanagar: Optimal bidding in multi-item multi-slot sponsored search auctions. 2
- Ittai Abraham, Moshe Babaioff, Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden: Combinatorial auctions with restricted complements. 3-16
- Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Azarakhsh Malekian: Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction. 17
- Saeed Alaei, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Vahid Liaghat: Online prophet-inequality matching with applications to ad allocation. 18-35
- Noga Alon, Moshe Babaioff, Ron Karidi, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz: Sequential voting with externalities: herding in social networks. 36
- Sanjeev Arora, Rong Ge, Sushant Sachdeva, Grant Schoenebeck: Finding overlapping communities in social networks: toward a rigorous approach. 37-54
- Eduardo M. Azevedo, Eric Budish: Strategyproofness in the large as a desideratum for market design. 55
- Moshe Babaioff, Shaddin Dughmi, Robert Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Slivkins: Dynamic pricing with limited supply. 74-91
- Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg, Renato Paes Leme: Optimal mechanisms for selling information. 92-109
- Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Robert Kleinberg, Yaron Singer: Learning on a budget: posted price mechanisms for online procurement. 128-145
- Eytan Bakshy, Dean Eckles, Rong Yan, Itamar Rosenn: Social influence in social advertising: evidence from field experiments. 146-161
- Dirk Bergemann, Ji Shen, Yun Xu, Edmund M. Yeh: Multi-dimensional mechanism design with limited information. 162-178
- Anand Bhalgat, Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kamesh Munagala: Mechanisms and allocations with positive network externalities. 179-196
- Craig Boutilier, Ioannis Caragiannis, Simi Haber, Tyler Lu, Ariel D. Procaccia, Or Sheffet: Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view. 197-214
- Aseem Brahma, Mithun Chakraborty, Sanmay Das, Allen Lavoie, Malik Magdon-Ismail: A bayesian market maker. 215-232
- John W. Byers, Michael Mitzenmacher, Georgios Zervas: The groupon effect on yelp ratings: a root cause analysis. 248-265
- Ioannis Caragiannis, Edith Elkind, Mario Szegedy, Lan Yu: Mechanism design: from partial to probabilistic verification. 266-283
- Ioannis Caragiannis, Angelo Fanelli, Nick Gravin, Alexander Skopalik: Approximate pure nash equilibria in weighted congestion games: existence, efficient computation, and structure. 284-301
- Peiji Chen, Wenjing Ma, Srinath Mandalapu, Chandrashekhar Nagarajan, Jayavel Shanmugasundaram, Sergei Vassilvitskii, Erik Vee, Manfai Yu, Jason Y. Zien: Ad serving using a compact allocation plan. 319-336
- Yun Kuen Cheung, Richard Cole, Ashish Rastogi: Tatonnement in ongoing markets of complementary goods. 337-354
- Flavio Chierichetti, Jon M. Kleinberg, Alessandro Panconesi: How to schedule a cascade in an arbitrary graph. 355-368
- Olivier Compte, Ron Lavi, Ella Segev: Efficiency of sequential english auctions with dynamic arrivals. 369
- Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg: Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design. 370-387
- Nikhil R. Devanur, Balasubramanian Sivan, Yossi Azar: Asymptotically optimal algorithm for stochastic adwords. 388-404
- Shahar Dobzinski, Jan Vondrák: The computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions. 405-422
- Elad Dokow, Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir, Ilan Nehama: Mechanism design on discrete lines and cycles. 423-440
- Miroslav Dudík, Sébastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock: A tractable combinatorial market maker using constraint generation. 459-476
- Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, Pichayut Jirapinyo, John K. Lai, Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes: Payment rules through discriminant-based classifiers. 477-494
- Federico Echenique, Adam Wierman: Finding a walrasian equilibrium is easy for a fixed number of agents. 495
- Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii M. Slinko: Clone structures in voters' preferences. 496-513
- Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme, Moshe Tennenholtz: Signaling schemes for revenue maximization. 514-531
- Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi, Piotr Sankowski: Revenue maximizing envy-free multi-unit auctions with budgets. 532-549
- Lisa Fleischer, Yu-Han Lyu: Approximately optimal auctions for selling privacy when costs are correlated with data. 568-585
- Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Ron Lavi: Conditional equilibrium outcomes via ascending price processes with applications to combinatorial auctions with item bidding. 586
- Nicola Gatti, Alessandro Lazaric, Francesco Trovò: A truthful learning mechanism for contextual multi-slot sponsored search auctions with externalities. 605-622
- Sharad Goel, Duncan J. Watts, Daniel G. Goldstein: The structure of online diffusion networks. 623-638
- Daniel G. Goldstein, Randolph Preston McAfee, Siddharth Suri: Improving the effectiveness of time-based display advertising. 639-654
- Ramakrishna Gummadi, Ramesh Johari, Jia Yuan Yu: Mean field equilibria of multiarmed bandit games. 655
- Martin Hoefer, Thomas Kesselheim: Secondary spectrum auctions for symmetric and submodular bidders. 657-671
- Krishnamurthy Iyer, Ramesh Johari, Ciamac Cyrus Moallemi: Information and the value of execution guarantees. 673
- Dietmar Jannach, Zeynep Karakaya, Fatih Gedikli: Accuracy improvements for multi-criteria recommender systems. 674-689
- Michael Kearns, J. Stephen Judd, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik: Behavioral experiments on a network formation game. 690-704
- John K. Lai, David C. Parkes: Monotone branch-and-bound search for restricted combinatorial auctions. 705-722
- Mohammad Mahdian, Arpita Ghosh, R. Preston McAfee, Sergei Vassilvitskii: To match or not to match: economics of cookie matching in online advertising. 741-753
- Thanh Nguyen: Coalitional bargaining in networks. 772
- Thanh Nguyen: Local bargaining and endogenous fluctuations. 773
- Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm: Profit-charging market makers with bounded loss, vanishing bid/ask spreads, and unlimited market depth. 790-807
- David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah: Beyond dominant resource fairness: extensions, limitations, and indivisibilities. 808-825
- Tim Roughgarden: The price of anarchy in games of incomplete information. 862-879
- Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes, Eric Horvitz, Kamal Jain, Mary Czerwinski, Desney S. Tan: Market user interface design. 898-915
- Troels Bjerre Sørensen: Computing a proper equilibrium of a bimatrix game. 916-928
- Jing Wang, Siddharth Suri, Duncan J. Watts: Cooperation and assortativity with endogenous partner selection. 945
- Lirong Xia: Computing the margin of victory for various voting rules. 982-999
data released under the ODC-BY 1.0 license. See also our legal information page
last updated on 2013-06-19T201401 by the dblp team