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Semantic Scholar13. ACM-EC 2012: Valencia, Spain
Boi Faltings, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Panos Ipeirotis:
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC '12, Valencia, Spain, June 4-8, 2012. ACM 2012, ISBN 978-1-4503-1415-2
Technical presentations papers
- Vibhanshu Abhishek, Kartik Hosanagar, Peter S. Fader:
On aggregation bias in sponsored search data: existence andimplications. 1 - Vibhanshu Abhishek, Kartik Hosanagar:
Optimal bidding in multi-item multi-slot sponsored search auctions. 2 - Ittai Abraham, Moshe Babaioff, Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden:
Combinatorial auctions with restricted complements. 3-16 - Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Azarakhsh Malekian:
Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction. 17 - Saeed Alaei, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Vahid Liaghat:
Online prophet-inequality matching with applications to ad allocation. 18-35 - Noga Alon, Moshe Babaioff, Ron Karidi, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Sequential voting with externalities: herding in social networks. 36 - Sanjeev Arora, Rong Ge, Sushant Sachdeva, Grant Schoenebeck:
Finding overlapping communities in social networks: toward a rigorous approach. 37-54 - Eduardo M. Azevedo, Eric Budish:
Strategyproofness in the large as a desideratum for market design. 55 - Moshe Babaioff, Shaddin Dughmi, Robert Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Slivkins:
Dynamic pricing with limited supply. 74-91 - Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg, Renato Paes Leme:
Optimal mechanisms for selling information. 92-109 - Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Robert Kleinberg, Yaron Singer:
Learning on a budget: posted price mechanisms for online procurement. 128-145 - Eytan Bakshy, Dean Eckles, Rong Yan, Itamar Rosenn:
Social influence in social advertising: evidence from field experiments. 146-161 - Dirk Bergemann, Ji Shen, Yun Xu, Edmund M. Yeh:
Multi-dimensional mechanism design with limited information. 162-178 - Anand Bhalgat, Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kamesh Munagala:
Mechanisms and allocations with positive network externalities. 179-196 - Craig Boutilier, Ioannis Caragiannis, Simi Haber, Tyler Lu, Ariel D. Procaccia, Or Sheffet:
Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view. 197-214 - Aseem Brahma, Mithun Chakraborty, Sanmay Das, Allen Lavoie, Malik Magdon-Ismail:
A bayesian market maker. 215-232 - John W. Byers, Michael Mitzenmacher, Georgios Zervas:
The groupon effect on yelp ratings: a root cause analysis. 248-265 - Ioannis Caragiannis, Edith Elkind, Mario Szegedy, Lan Yu:
Mechanism design: from partial to probabilistic verification. 266-283 - Ioannis Caragiannis, Angelo Fanelli, Nick Gravin, Alexander Skopalik:
Approximate pure nash equilibria in weighted congestion games: existence, efficient computation, and structure. 284-301 - Peiji Chen, Wenjing Ma, Srinath Mandalapu, Chandrashekhar Nagarajan, Jayavel Shanmugasundaram, Sergei Vassilvitskii, Erik Vee, Manfai Yu, Jason Y. Zien:
Ad serving using a compact allocation plan. 319-336 - Yun Kuen Cheung, Richard Cole, Ashish Rastogi:
Tatonnement in ongoing markets of complementary goods. 337-354 - Flavio Chierichetti, Jon M. Kleinberg, Alessandro Panconesi:
How to schedule a cascade in an arbitrary graph. 355-368 - Olivier Compte, Ron Lavi, Ella Segev:
Efficiency of sequential english auctions with dynamic arrivals. 369 - Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design. 370-387 - Nikhil R. Devanur, Balasubramanian Sivan, Yossi Azar:
Asymptotically optimal algorithm for stochastic adwords. 388-404 - Shahar Dobzinski, Jan Vondrák:
The computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions. 405-422 - Elad Dokow, Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir, Ilan Nehama:
Mechanism design on discrete lines and cycles. 423-440 - Miroslav Dudík, Sébastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock:
A tractable combinatorial market maker using constraint generation. 459-476 - Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, Pichayut Jirapinyo, John K. Lai, Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes:
Payment rules through discriminant-based classifiers. 477-494 - Federico Echenique, Adam Wierman:
Finding a walrasian equilibrium is easy for a fixed number of agents. 495 - Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii M. Slinko:
Clone structures in voters' preferences. 496-513 - Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Signaling schemes for revenue maximization. 514-531 - Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi, Piotr Sankowski:
Revenue maximizing envy-free multi-unit auctions with budgets. 532-549 - Lisa Fleischer, Yu-Han Lyu:
Approximately optimal auctions for selling privacy when costs are correlated with data. 568-585 - Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Ron Lavi:
Conditional equilibrium outcomes via ascending price processes with applications to combinatorial auctions with item bidding. 586 - Nicola Gatti, Alessandro Lazaric, Francesco Trovò:
A truthful learning mechanism for contextual multi-slot sponsored search auctions with externalities. 605-622 - Sharad Goel, Duncan J. Watts, Daniel G. Goldstein:
The structure of online diffusion networks. 623-638 - Daniel G. Goldstein, Randolph Preston McAfee, Siddharth Suri:
Improving the effectiveness of time-based display advertising. 639-654 - Ramakrishna Gummadi, Ramesh Johari, Jia Yuan Yu:
Mean field equilibria of multiarmed bandit games. 655 - Martin Hoefer, Thomas Kesselheim:
Secondary spectrum auctions for symmetric and submodular bidders. 657-671 - Krishnamurthy Iyer, Ramesh Johari, Ciamac Cyrus Moallemi:
Information and the value of execution guarantees. 673 - Dietmar Jannach, Zeynep Karakaya, Fatih Gedikli:
Accuracy improvements for multi-criteria recommender systems. 674-689 - Michael Kearns, J. Stephen Judd, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik:
Behavioral experiments on a network formation game. 690-704 - John K. Lai, David C. Parkes:
Monotone branch-and-bound search for restricted combinatorial auctions. 705-722 - Mohammad Mahdian, Arpita Ghosh, R. Preston McAfee, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
To match or not to match: economics of cookie matching in online advertising. 741-753 - Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm:
Profit-charging market makers with bounded loss, vanishing bid/ask spreads, and unlimited market depth. 790-807 - David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah:
Beyond dominant resource fairness: extensions, limitations, and indivisibilities. 808-825 - Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes, Eric Horvitz, Kamal Jain, Mary Czerwinski, Desney S. Tan:
Market user interface design. 898-915 - Jing Wang, Siddharth Suri, Duncan J. Watts:
Cooperation and assortativity with endogenous partner selection. 945
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