First to market

• 
  Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan: Beyond moulin mechanisms. 1-10
• 
  Thành Nguyen, Éva Tardos: Approximately maximizing efficiency and revenue in polyhedral environments. 11-19
• 
  Mira Gonen, Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov: Generalized trade reduction mechanisms. 20-29
• 
  Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer: Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments. 30-39

The price is right

• 
  Jon Feldman, S. Muthukrishnan, Martin Pál, Clifford Stein: Budget optimization in search-based advertising auctions. 40-49
• 
  Sébastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock: Revenue analysis of a family of ranking rules for keyword auctions. 50-56
• 
  Juan Feng, Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang: Dynamic price competition on the internet: advertising auctions. 57-58
• 
  Garud Iyengar, Anuj Kumar: An equilibrium model for matching impatient demand and patient supply over time. 59-65

Pass It On

• 
  Esteban Arcaute, Adam Kirsch, Ravi Kumar, David Liben-Nowell, Sergei Vassilvitskii: On threshold behavior in query incentive networks. 66-74
• 
  Nicole Immorlica, Jon M. Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian, Tom Wexler: The role of compatibility in the diffusion of technologies through social networks. 75-83
• 
  Amir Epstein, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour: Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games. 84-92
• 
  Yogeshwer Sharma, David P. Williamson: Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism. 93-102
• 
  Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg, Christos H. Papadimitriou: Congestion games with malicious players. 103-112

Empirical excursions

• 
  Kan Takeuchi, John Lin, Yan Chen, Thomas A. Finholt: Shake it up baby: scheduling with package auctions. 113
• 
  James Reilly, Jiyong Zhang, Lorraine McGinty, Pearl Pu, Barry Smyth: Evaluating compound critiquing recommenders: a real-user study. 114-123
• 
  Stephan Schosser, Klemens Böhm, Bodo Vogt: Indirect partner interaction in peer-to-peer networks: stimulating cooperation by means of structure. 124-133
• 
  Arjun Talwar, Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings: Understanding user behavior in online feedback reporting. 134-142

A complex collection

• 
  Larry Blume, David A. Easley, Jon M. Kleinberg, Éva Tardos: Trading networks with price-setting agents. 143-151
• 
  Georg Gottlob, Gianluigi Greco: On the complexity of combinatorial auctions: structured item graphs and hypertree decomposition. 152-161
• 
  Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg: Computing good nash equilibria in graphical games. 162-171
• 
  Daniel Golovin: Stochastic packing-market planning. 172-181

Recommended for people like you

• 
  Christopher Scaffidi, Kevin Bierhoff, Eric Chang, Mikhael Felker, Herman Ng, Chun Jin: Red Opal: product-feature scoring from reviews. 182-191
• 
  Daniel M. Fleder, Kartik Hosanagar: Recommender systems and their impact on sales diversity. 192-199
• 
  Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings: Collusion-resistant, incentive-compatible feedback payments. 200-209
• 
  Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz: Congestion games with load-dependent failures: identical resources. 210-217

The price is optimal

• 
  David Kempe, Adam Meyerson, Nainesh Solanki, Ramnath K. Chellappa: Pricing of partially compatible products. 218-226
• 
  Yagil Engel, Michael P. Wellman: Generalized value decomposition and structured multiattribute auctions. 227-236
• 
  John O. Ledyard: Optimal combinatoric auctions with single-minded bidders. 237-242
• 
  Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Robert D. Kleinberg: Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations. 243-251
• 
  Ron Lavi, Chaitanya Swamy: Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity. 252-261

Searching for sponsors

• 
  Matthew Cary, Aparna Das, Benjamin Edelman, Ioannis Giotis, Kurtis Heimerl, Anna R. Karlin, Claire Mathieu, Michael Schwarz: Greedy bidding strategies for keyword auctions. 262-271
• 
  Zoë Abrams, Ofer Mendelevitch, John Tomlin: Optimal delivery of sponsored search advertisements subject to budget constraints. 272-278
• 
  Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz: Mediators in position auctions. 279-287
• 
  Mohammad Mahdian, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Amin Saberi: Allocating online advertisement space with unreliable estimates. 288-294

Not for sale

• 
  David J. Abraham, Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm: Clearing algorithms for barter exchange markets: enabling nationwide kidney exchanges. 295-304
• 
  Ian A. Kash, Eric J. Friedman, Joseph Y. Halpern: Optimizing scrip systems: efficiency, crashes, hoarders, and altruists. 305-315
• 
  Evdokia Nikolova, Rahul Sami: A strategic model for information markets. 316-325
• 
  Yiling Chen, Lance Fortnow, Evdokia Nikolova, David M. Pennock: Betting on permutations. 326-335

Last but not least

• 
  Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg: Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover. 336-345
• 
  Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan: Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions. 346-351
• 
  Tomás Feder, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Amin Saberi: Approximating nash equilibria using small-support strategies. 352-354
• 
  Constantinos Daskalakis, Aranyak Mehta, Christos H. Papadimitriou: Progress in approximate nash equilibria. 355-358

Workshops

• 
  Daniel Grosu, Ratul Mahajan, Rahul Sami: Joint workshop on the economics of networked systems and incentive-based computing. 359-360
• 
  Yiling Chen, John O. Ledyard, David M. Pennock, Eric Zitzewitz: Second workshop on prediction markets. 361-362
• 
  Mehmet Sayal, Martin Hepp: EC 2007 workshop outline -- DEECS 2007: the 3rd international workshop on data engineering issues in e-commerce and services. 363-364

Tutorials

• 
  Yiling Chen: Prediction markets: economics, computation, and mechanism design. 365
• 
  Neel Sundaresan: Online trust and reputation systems. 366-367
• 
  Foster J. Provost, Arun Sundararajan: Modeling complex networks for electronic commerce. 368
• 
  Kartik Hosanagar, Michael Schwarz: Tutorial on sponsored search. 369

last updated on Tue May 21 02:29:07 2013 by the dblp team
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