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Studies in the philosophy of logic and knowledge, 2004
- Thomas R. Baldwin, Timothy Smiley:
Studies in the philosophy of logic and knowledge. Oxford University Press 2004, ISBN 978-0-19-726291-7, pp. 1-291 - John McDowell:
Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge. Studies in the philosophy of logic and knowledge 2004: 7-30 - Simon Blackburn:
Knowledge, Truth, and Reliability. Studies in the philosophy of logic and knowledge 2004: 31-50 - Crispin Wright:
Facts and Certainty. Studies in the philosophy of logic and knowledge 2004: 51-94 - Edward Craig:
Advice to Philosophers: Three New Leaves to Turn Over. Studies in the philosophy of logic and knowledge 2004: 95-112 - Thomas Baldwin:
Two Types of Naturalism. Studies in the philosophy of logic and knowledge 2004: 113-130 - Timothy Smiley:
The Theory of Descriptions. Studies in the philosophy of logic and knowledge 2004: 131-162 - Christopher Peacocke:
Understanding Logical Constants: A Realists Account. Studies in the philosophy of logic and knowledge 2004: 163-208 - Richard Mark Sainsbury:
Indexicals and Reported Speech. Studies in the philosophy of logic and knowledge 2004: 209-234 - James Edward John Altham:
Reporting Indexicals. Studies in the philosophy of logic and knowledge 2004: 235-248 - James Higginbotham:
On Higher-Order Logic and Natural Language. Studies in the philosophy of logic and knowledge 2004: 249- - David Bostock:
On Motivating Higher-Order Logic. Studies in the philosophy of logic and knowledge 2004
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